

Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06SANJOSE488, COSTA RICA: GUATEMALAN CAMPAIGN LOOKS WEAK FOR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags `#cablegate` and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. `#06SANJOSE488`.

| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| 06SANJOSE488 | 2006-03-03 20:53 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose |

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-12/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2711772.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-10/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2707705.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-10/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2707712.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-10/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2707716.aspx>

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000488

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2016

TAGS: [PREL](#) [CS](#) [PGOC](#) [UNSC](#)

SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: GUATEMALAN CAMPAIGN LOOKS WEAK FOR
NON-PERMANENT UNSC SEAT

REF: STATE 27055

Classified By: DCM Russell Frisbie for reasons 1.4 (b&d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Costa Rica will support Guatemala's efforts to win the rotational Latin seat on the UNSC. The Foreign Minister and Director of Foreign Policy told us separately that Guatemala needs to campaign more aggressively, particularly in the Caribbean, and offered to assist. These officials are pessimistic about Guatemala's chances. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Ambassador Langdale discussed reftel points with Foreign Minister Tovar on March 2, 2006. Tovar confirmed that Costa Rica will support Guatemala's campaign in the October elections. Tovar stated that Latin support for Guatemala was solid "north of Colombia," but lamented what he called a "weak" campaign on Guatemala's part. Tovar felt Guatemala was relying too much on the argument that it has never held a seat on the Security Council, and that this argument was failing to convince many in the face of incentives offered by Venezuela. Tovar regretted Ecuador's withdrawal from the race and wished a stronger candidate, like Colombia, were available.

¶3. (C) With the Ambassador looking on, Tovar phoned Costa Rican UN Permrep Bruno Stagno for a read-out. According to Tovar, Stagno believes Europe supports Guatemala, but Venezuela has made good progress in Africa. Venezuela also

has the lead in the Caribbean, according to Tovar. Tovar said that since the ballot is secret, the Caribbean will not vote as a block. Tovar added that Costa Rica would be helpful in peeling a number of Caribbean votes away from Venezuela.

¶4. (C) Comparing Guatemala's campaign to Costa Rica's successful bid for Secretary General of the OAS, Tovar remarked that it was important for the United States to maintain a low profile. Cuban and Venezuelan lobbying against the "U.S. candidate" in the Caribbean had been a key part of Costa Rica's victory, Tovar said.

¶5. (C) Polcouns separately discussed reftel demarche with Ambassador Jose Joaquin Chaverri, Director of Foreign Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during a meeting on February 27. While Chaverri reiterated Costa Rica's support for Guatemala's candidacy, he expressed doubt that Venezuela will be denied.

¶6. (C) Chaverri also stated that Guatemala's road to the UNSC will necessarily go through CARICOM via Belize. Since CARICOM includes 14 of the 33 UN votes in GRULAC, winning support from the Caribbean bloc is essential. Chaverri thought that without Belizean support before CARICOM, the bloc will have a convenient excuse to vote for Venezuela, which has long courted the Caribbean nations.

¶7. (C) Given Venezuela's well-financed campaign, traditional support from CARICOM, and stated support from at least 5 additional GRULAC countries, Chaverri rated Guatemala's chances of defeating Venezuela as very slight. He said that if Guatemala was really serious, its foreign minister will need to campaign by traveling to every country in the hemisphere.

LANGDALE